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P E R S P E C T I V E
          
Controversy over recent revelations concerning the
adverse cardiovascular effects of selective cyclooxy-
genase-2 (COX-2) inhibitors has generally been
framed as a story of regulatory failure, in which the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has failed in
its mission to protect the public from unsafe prod-
ucts. But this simplistic understanding of the mis-
sion of the FDA seems to make failure all but in-
evitable, if the reliable observation of the risks and
benefits of a drug requires rigorous long-term stud-
ies. Perhaps in an earlier era the goal of drug regula-




Today, drug regulation guides the development of
information that turns poisons, used advisedly, into
drugs. From this perspective, the growing knowl-
edge of the complex effects of COX-2 inhibitors
might be retold as a story of regulatory success.
Drugs are information-rich chemicals that in
some respects resemble other information prod-
ucts (such as databases) more than they do other
chemicals (such as industrial solvents). Informa-
tion derived from rigorous testing distinguishes
the chemicals we call “drugs” from similar chemi-
cals sold for other purposes or even for the same
purposes (such as minimally regulated dietary sup-
plements). Creating new molecules has become
relatively cheap, but determining their effects in





 Moreover, the job is never
finished. Years after a product has appeared on the
market, further studies may reveal that it is use-
less or even toxic in patients with an indication for
which it was once widely prescribed (e.g., hormone-
replacement therapy for the prevention of heart dis-
ease in postmenopausal women) or, conversely, that
a product once withdrawn because of toxic effects
has unsuspected therapeutic benefits (e.g., thalido-
mide for leprosy). Information about drug effects
is an extremely valuable resource for guiding both
sound therapeutic choices and future product de-
velopment.
Although we rely primarily on pharmaceutical
firms to supply this information, we have reason to
worry that, in an unregulated market, these firms
would provide either too little information or dis-
torted information. Getting profit-seeking compa-
nies to provide reliable information about the ef-
fects of drugs in patients is thus a major challenge
for regulators.
One problem that is common to many markets
for information products is that firms that produce
the information may be unable to capture its val-
ue. Suppose a seller of unpatented dietary supple-
ments believes that it could increase demand for
its products by conducting clinical trials to con-
vince skeptics that the products are safe and effec-
tive. At best, the seller would have to share this ex-
panded market with competitors who did not pay
for the trials. Facing this competition, it could not
raise its prices, even though the tested product
would be worth more to consumers than the un-
tested product. The trials would look like a poor
investment.
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Patents mitigate this problem by allowing firms
to exclude competitors from the market and, thus,
to set prices that reflect the enhanced value to con-
sumers of the information-rich product — but
only up to a point. As the end of the patent term ap-
proaches, a firm may find it hard to recover the costs
of clinical trials by selling a product at a premium
price before competition comes into play. Patents
therefore do more to promote the early testing of
new drugs than the further testing of old drugs.
FDA-administered periods of market exclusivity





A more intractable problem is that firms have
no way to capture the value of negative informa-
tion. Clinical trials may increase demand if they
show that a drug is safe and effective, but they will
reduce demand if they show the opposite. The in-
formation is socially valuable either way, but the
value of negative information accrues entirely to
patients, insurers, and sellers of substitute prod-
ucts, rather than to the drug’s manufacturer.
A recent case in point is rofecoxib (Vioxx). After
receiving FDA approval in the late 1990s to market
rofecoxib for the treatment of pain and inflamma-
tion associated with osteoarthritis, menstruation,
and rheumatoid arthritis, Merck pursued addition-
al trials of the drug for the prevention of recurrent
colonic polyps. These trials confirmed previous
indications that treatment with rofecoxib increases





lifesaving information that has considerable value
to patients, doctors, scientists, insurers, and com-
petitors. But from the viewpoint of Merck and its
shareholders, the information destroyed value.
This radical difference in perspective makes it im-
prudent to rely on the unfettered judgment of phar-
maceutical firms to determine what we learn about
the effects of drugs.
Firms face powerful incentives to develop and
disclose information selectively, and perhaps even
to delude themselves, in order to maximize sales.
FDA regulation constrains these impulses by pro-
viding oversight of trial design, scrutiny of results
by FDA scientists and outside experts, and assur-





 Consider, again, Merck’s fateful deci-
sion to test rofecoxib for the prevention of recurrent
colonic polyps. By this point, data from a prior study
comparing rofecoxib with naproxen had suggested
that cardiovascular risk was increased among pa-
tients taking rofecoxib. Although Merck optimisti-
cally attributed the difference to protective effects
of naproxen rather than to toxic effects of rofecox-
ib, Merck scientists surely realized that further data
could potentially support either hypothesis. Why
would Merck take such a risk with a product that
had sales of $2.5 billion a year?
Without dismissing the motivating power of
scientific integrity and concern for public health, it
seems likely that regulatory considerations fortified
Merck’s resolve to pursue further trials. Regulatory
constraints on off-label marketing would limit avail-
able strategies for persuading doctors to prescribe
(and insurers to pay for) an expensive drug like ro-
fecoxib for prophylactic use without FDA approval,
particularly in the face of questions about toxicity.
A similar study was already under way of Pfizer’s
rival product, celecoxib (Celebrex), threatening to
put Merck at a marketing disadvantage if celecox-
ib were approved for an indication that remained
off-label for rofecoxib. FDA oversight also undoubt-
edly helped to persuade Merck that the cardiovas-
cular effects of rofecoxib called for further study.
Although the FDA has limited power to compel
firms to conduct post-marketing studies, it must
approve the labeling for drugs, and it has the au-
thority to issue a public health advisory or even re-
call a product with adverse effects from the market,





Recent newspaper accounts report that Merck
marketing executives, reluctant to signal a lack of
confidence in rofecoxib, opposed a study focused





decided, in consultation with the FDA, to monitor
data on these risks in ongoing studies of new in-
dications, thereby signaling optimism about new
markets rather than concern about side effects. As
more data came in, the FDA reached agreement
with Merck to disclose the cardiovascular risks in




 Perhaps Merck hoped
that rigorous long-term studies, culminating in the
FDA’s imprimatur on a supplemental new drug ap-
plication, would put this concern to rest.
Some commentators have argued that the FDA
should have required Merck to conduct trials de-
signed primarily to evaluate cardiovascular toxic
effects, rather than simply observing cardiovascu-





 Perhaps a regulatory process
that gave a larger role in trial design to independent
regulators, rather than leaving it largely to manu-
facturers, would generate more information about
toxic effects at an earlier stage. But it is not obvious
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that doing so would provide more valuable infor-
mation more quickly than the system we have now.
Studies testing efficacy and safety are more in-
formative than those testing safety alone; indeed, it
is difficult to make sense of the concept of safety
apart from the vantage point of particular patient
populations and therapeutic goals. To rank safety
ahead of efficacy seems to miss the obvious point
that patients may be harmed by disease as well as
by drugs. The challenge for physicians is to know
which risks are worth taking for which patients —
an evaluation that requires understanding benefits
as well as risks. The challenge for regulators is to
see that the necessary information is developed
and disseminated appropriately and that marketing
claims do not get ahead of the data. Only through
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